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COMMENTS
PRE-ARREST SILENCE:
MINDING THAT GAP BETWEEN FOURTH




The legal aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States
on September 11, 2001 has raised countless issues regarding the
rights of the criminally accused balanced against the government's
interest in gathering intelligence and protecting the nation.' A recent
incident involving airport security highlighted the tension between
the attempt to heighten national security and a citizen's constitutional
procedural protections. On July 29, 2002, Ali Khan, an American
Muslim official, was detained in an airport for an hour and forty-five
minutes because his name and physical description "was a close
match" to a person on a no-fly list that the Transportation Security
Administration had distributed to airlines.2 After being questioned in
front of other passengers, he was escorted to a private room where
two Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agents informed him
that he could cooperate "the easy way or the hard way."3 Khan chose
the "easy way," answered the FBI's questions, and was ultimately
released.4
Candidate for Juris Doctor in May 2003, Northwestern University School of Law.
See generally, Steven Lubet, Prosecuting Our 'Enemy Combatants,' CHI. TRI., June 23,
2002, at C9.
2 Steve Tetreault, Muslim Official Alleges Profiling, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Aug. 7, 2002, at
I B.
3 Id.
4 Las Vegas FBI special agent Daron Borst said, "After a brief interview, it was
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Suppose Khan had preferred to cooperate the "hard way," by
refusing to answer questions until he consulted with his lawyer.
Many Americans perceive that the United States Constitution grants a
"right to remain silent"5 and, whether or not this notion is correct,6
Khan's choice to take the hard way-to remain silent-could have
potentially haunted him for the remainder of the government's case
against him.' In many states and federal circuits, a prosecutor may
convey to a jury, through cross-examination or closing argument, that
in the period before a person is arrested and read his or her Miranda
warnings,' a person's refusal to speak indicates his or her guilt.9 This
inference could weigh heavily in a juror's assessment of a
defendant's guilt: had the FBI asked Khan questions about his
identity and travel plans, and Khan refused to answer and was
subsequently arrested and charged, a reasonable juror could easily
infer that Khan must have been guilty or else he would have nothing
to hide. 0
determined he was not the same person, and he was sent on his way." Id.
5 This right, derived from the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
articulated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), has been "embedded in routine
police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture."
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 ,443 (2000).
6 The exercise of the right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment is only
constitutionally protected from adverse inference in the period after a suspect is arrested and
Miranda warnings are read. See infra Section 111.
7 This comment addresses the fact that pre-arrest silence can be used as evidence of guilt
in criminal prosecutions.
" "[I]f a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in
clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. . . . The warning of the
right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and
will be used against the individual in court . . . . [A]n individual held for interrogation must
be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with
him during interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today.
As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated can be used as
evidence against him, this warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation." Miranda,
384 U.S. at 467-71.
9 The First, Second, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits prohibit the substantive use of
pre-arrest silence, and the Fifth, Eighth Ninth and Eleventh Circuits allow it. See infra notes
109-111, for specific cases citations. Minnesota, Washington, Wisconsin, Ohio, Georgia and
Tennessee prohibit substantive use of pre-arrest silence. California and Michigan allow it.
See infra note 112 (for specific case citations).
10 A "layman's natural first suggestion would probably be that the resort to [the Fifth
Amendment] privilege [to remain silent]... is a clear confession of a crime." 8 John Henry
Wigmore, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 2272, at 426 (John T. McNaughton, ed.,
rev. ed. 1961). Silence in response to questioning carries the tone of a tacit admission. Even
the Federal Rules of Evidence recognize silence as "a statement of which the party has
manifested an adoption or belief in its truth." FED. R. EvID. 801 (d)(2)(B). According to the
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Such refusals to speak fall under the legal umbrella of "pre-arrest
silence," because they involve a person suspected of committing a
criminal act who chooses not to answer questions, but who has not
yet been read his Miranda warnings. This comment will focus on the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, its related
"right to remain silent," and the period after a suspect's movement is
restricted by the government, but before the suspect is formally
arrested and read his or her Miranda rights. 1 It will argue that a
suspect's reasonable state of mind should be considered in
determining whether a suspect was compelled by law enforcement
officers to speak, and thus whether a prosecutor may use evidence of
pre-arrest silence." Further, it will argue that this consideration
should take into account the reality of police-citizen encounters, such
as brief investigative detentions permitted under Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.' 3
In Section II, this comment will provide a brief overview of the
development of the Fifth Amendment, starting with its historical
origins, continuing with its Warren Court expansion in Miranda v.
Arizona, and ending with a brief discussion of its modern day
parameters. In Section III, this comment will explain the most
common arguments opposing and supporting the substantive use of
pre-arrest silence. This section will begin by explaining the treatment
of pre-arrest silence under the penalty doctrine put forth by Griffin v.
California,4 and then discuss the criticism of Griffin and the related
arguments of why substantive use of pre-arrest silence should be
Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 801(d)(2)(B), "when silence is relied upon, the theory
is that the person would, under the circumstances, protest the statement made in his
presence, if untrue." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) advisory committee's note. See also People
v. Schicci, No. 5469/99, slip. op. at 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2-, 2002), available at 2002 N.Y.
Slip Op. 50094U, at *5, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 413, at **5 (citing People v. DeGeorge, 73
N.Y.2d 614, 619 (N.Y. 1989)) (held that evidence of silence, though "viewed with caution,"
is admissible if the "defendant's failure to speak is unambiguously consistent with
adoption.").
" The pre-arrest detention period is crucial to government agents who are trying to get
information. Affording detainees the privilege against self-incrimination, particularly the
right to remain silent, could devastate the government's ability to collect intelligence. "As
secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said of Jose Padilla [a detained terrorist suspect] 'We
are not interested in trying him at the moment,' but rather in 'finding out what he knows."'
Lubet, supra note 2, at C9.
12 See infra Section V.B.
13 See infra Section V.B. (discussing the reasons for defining compulsion based on the
degree to which law enforcement officers intimidate a suspect, regardless of whether the
suspect is entitled to Miranda warnings).
14 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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permitted. In Section IV, this comment will discuss the analyses
employed by the Courts of Appeals and state courts. This section
attempts to illustrate how the decision as to whether pre-arrest silence
should be admitted as substantive evidence relates to whether the
court finds that an atmosphere existed in which a person would feel
compelled to incriminate herself and whether the person was silent,
invoking her Fifth Amendment rights, as a result of this atmosphere.
In Section V, this comment will discuss a person's silence during
non-arrest, police-citizen encounters, such as brief detentions, and
how the intersection of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments create a
mismatch between the law, the law's presumed intentions, and the
psychological realities of these encounters. It will conclude by
arguing that the definition of compulsion for the purposes of
admitting or excluding pre-arrest silence should be broad enough to
encompass pre-arrest police-citizen encounters, and that the suspect's
reasonable state of mind should be considered.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states
that "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."15 This clause is "an unsolved riddle of vast
proportions, a Gordian knot in the middle of our Bill of Rights"
because courts and scholars have been unable to define the proper
scope of the privilege.16 This is so because the historical roots of the
Fifth Amendment have been glossed by the evolution of the law and
the realities of modem law enforcement to the extent that courts
ambiguously apply the privilege against self-incrimination. 7 This
section will trace the development of the right to remain silent from
its origins in England to its modem-day role in American society.
A. ORIGINS: THE CRUEL TRILEMMA
In tracing the origins of the clause, some scholars have viewed it
as a relic from 17th century efforts to abolish the coercive
15 U.S. CONST. amend. V., cl. 3.
16 Akhil Reed Amar & Rene B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MIcH. L. REV. 857, 857 (1995).
17 See id. at 859-60 ("We must note that an enormous amount of modem criminal law
enforcement has been shaped by the Self-Incrimination Clause, as (mis)construed over the
years... . [T]he vastness of the Self-Incrimination Clause[] sprawl[s] across the U.S.
Reports into a great many doctrinal comers and crevices ....").
[Vol, 93
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questioning practices of Ecclesiastical Courts.18 These courts would
force the accused to take an oath and then face the "cruel trilemma"
of incriminating himself, perjuring himself under oath, or being held
in contempt of court by refusing to answer in an interrogation. 9 This
compulsion to tell the truth was regarded as cruel because of the
solemnity associated with the oath in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries 2°-a solemnity that had the power to torture the spirit of the
accused.2'
The Fifth Amendment was designed to protect the accused from
this cruel trilemma.22 Thus, many Fifth Amendment scholars and
judges believe that the clause focused on improper methods of
gaining information from criminal suspects rather than affording
defendants a right to remain silent; 3 the right "not to be compelled"
did not mean the actual right to remain silent, but the right not to be
forced to speak.24
B. THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
The privilege against self-incrimination transformed into an
officially recognized right to remain silent through the language of
case law during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.25 In the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court commented on the broad values
enveloped by the Fifth Amendment. 6 In Murphy v. Waterfront
18 See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective [hereinafter
"Alschuler, Peculiar Privilege I"], in R.H. HELMHOLZ ET. AL, THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 181, 185-90 (1997).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 188 ("It was still a time when questions about whether bread and wine became
Christ's body or merely symbolized them were matters over which men willingly fought and
died...
21 id.
22 Id. at 192.
23 Id. at 192. See also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 620 (1965) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "compulsion is the focus of the inquiry," and references the practices
of the Court of High Commission or Star Chamber that subjected suspects to a "far reaching
and deeply probing inquiry" that the suspect refused to answer on "pain of incarceration,
banishment or mutilation").
24 Timothy O'Neill, Why Miranda Does Not Prevent Confessions; Some Lessons from
Albert Camus, Arthur Miller and Oprah Winfrey, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 863,870 (2001).
25 See Alschuler, Peculiar Privilege II, supra note 19, at 197-201 (explaining judicial
opinions throughout the nineteenth century and twentieth century through which right to
silence evolved); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. at 434 (discussing the
development of cases leading up to Miranda v. Arizona).
26 In addition to cases mentioned, see also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486
(1951) (explaining that the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination must be
20031
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Commission,27 the Court explained that the privilege against self-
incrimination:
reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-
accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will
be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates a
'fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual
alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in
its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load'; our respect for the
inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life'; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements;
and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is often
,a protection to the innocent. ' 28
Under this broadened scope of Fifth Amendment rights, the
Court projected "the right to remain silent" into the public lexicon 29
with Miranda v. Arizona.30 The Court held that the prosecution must
demonstrate the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination.31 Miranda, however, did not
hold that the right to remain silent was encapsulated by the privilege
against self-incrimination. 2  Rather, the phrase "right to remain
silent" materialized in the Court's instruction as to what the
procedural safeguards should include: "At the outset, if a person in
custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed
in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain
silent."3 Because the Court never discussed the particular guarantees
of the Fifth Amendment, but rather discussed the necessity of
protecting it in general, the Fifth Amendment's inclusion of the right
to remain silent seems to be assumed throughout the Court's
opinion.34
given a liberal construction).
27 378 U.S. 52 (1964)
28 Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
29 "[D]ue to the popularity of police and law related television shows and movies, the
right to remain silent is one of the best known constitutional rights." Aaron R. Pettit, Should
the Prosecution Be Allowed to Comment on a Defendant's Pre-Arrest Silence in its Case-In-
Chief?, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 181, 181 (1997).
30 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
I' Id. at 444.
32 id.
33 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68.
34 In Miranda, the Court implicitly derives the right to remain silent as a part of the Fifth
Amendment after a discussion of the coercive interrogation practices in seventeenth century
England. 384 U.S at 442-43.
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C. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF MIRANDA
Consistent with the history of the Fifth Amendment,35
"compulsion was a key element in Miranda."36 Miranda asserted that
compulsion was present in all cases of in-custody interrogation-"the
very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual
liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals., 37  But the Court
defined vague limits on what constituted custodial interrogation.38
On the one hand, the Court stated, "[b]y custodial interrogation, we
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way."39 On the other hand, the Court noted
that "[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a
crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact finding
process is not affected by our holding."4 °  The Court made its
decision in response to confessions elicited in a "police dominated
atmosphere,"'" but failed to provide guidelines for courts to
determine what constitutes such an atmosphere.42
The Supreme Court has attempted to define the concept of
custodial interrogation in several opinions.43  In California v.
Beheler,44 the Court specified the formality of arrest necessary to
constitute 'custody' under Miranda by holding that a suspect is not in
custody until "there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
" See infra Section II. (discussing that compulsion was the main concern of the framers
of the Fifth Amendment).
36 Richard A. Williamson, The Virtues (and Limits) of Shared Values: The Fourth
Amendment and Miranda's Concept of Custody, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 379, 387 (1993) ("The
element of compulsion ... was the key to the Miranda decision ... .
37 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455.
38 Note, Custodial Engineering: Cleaning Up the Scope of Miranda Custody During
Coercive Terry Stops, 108 HARV. L. REV. 665, 675 (1995) ("Miranda's own language
encouraged this broad application: 'custodial interrogation' potentially comprehended more
than station-house interrogation.").
39 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added).
40 Id. at 477.
41 Id. at 445.
42 Richard A. Williamson argues that this is because the decision did not use the familiar
term of arrest to define what it meant by "in-custody," "one could argue that that the Court
intended to leave open the possibility that a person not under arrest could thus be in
custody." Williamson, supra note 37, at 389.
43 See generally Note, supra note 38, at 674-75 (discussing the development of the
"Beheler-Berkemer standard" that clarified the definition of "custody" as a functional
arrest.).
44 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).
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movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest., 45  In
Minnesota v. Murphy,46 the Court held that a man who made
incriminating statements in response to questions from his probation
officer was not in custody for Miranda purposes. Even though the
officer "could compel Murphy's attendance and truthful answers,
the Court found Murphy outside the purview of Miranda's
procedural protections because Murphy failed to properly invoke his
rights and because his regular meetings with the officer should have
insulated him from "the psychological intimidation that might
overbear his desire to claim the privilege.
48
In addition to the holdings of Murphy and Beheler, the Court has
stated that in the custody determination, "the only relevant inquiry is
how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have
understood his situation., 49  In construing this objective standard,
courts have considered the use of guns, handcuffs, or forcing a
suspect into a squad car as placing the suspect in custody. But these
guidelines fail to answer whether "Miranda purposes""1 means the
point at which a suspect must be given the Miranda warnings so that
any statement made after the warnings may be included as trial
evidence, 2 or whether the right to silence (in other words, the right
not to answer questions without being subjected to adverse inference)
begins when Miranda warnings are given. 3 One interpretation of the
right to remain silent is that it is a broad Fifth Amendment right to be
silent-a further evolution of the privilege against self-
incrimination. 4 The other interpretation is consistent with the Fifth
41 Id. at 1125.
46 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
41 Id. at 430.
48 Id. at 433.
49 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
'o See Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda: Two Constitutional Doctrines
Collide, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 725-26 n.82-84 (1994) (providing a citation listing cases
in which a defendant held in handcuffs and at gunpoint could reasonably think that he was in
custody).
51 In Minnesota v. Murphy, the Court discussed the definition of custody "for purposes of
receiving Miranda protection." Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430. Both Murphy and California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983), dealt with Miranda in terms of whether a suspect's self-
incriminating statements should be excluded.
52 Miranda v. Arizona established an exclusionary rule: any statement obtained from a
defendant undergoing custodial interrogation who had not been recited his Miranda rights
may not be used as evidence. 384 U.S. 436,443 (1966).
53 See United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1998).
54 E.g. State v. Easter, 922 P.2d 1285 (Wash. 1996) (en banc) ("An accused's right to
[Vol. 93
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Amendment's history as a solution to the cruel trilemma; the right to
silence exists only as a prophylactic tool against self-incrimination in
the face of state compulsion.5
Since Miranda, the Supreme Court has vacillated between these
two concepts of the Fifth Amendment. 6  This uncertainty has
resulted in confusion about "whether a fact finder may appropriately
treat the refusal of a suspect or defendant to speak as one indication
of her guilt."57 The ultimate question resulting from this interpretive
discrepancy is what types of interactions place a person in a situation
in which she is compelled to incriminate herself, such that Miranda
rights attach:"8 for example, must the police formally arrest and read
Miranda warnings to a suspect for the suspect's silence to be
protected from adverse inference, or does the presence of state
compulsion deserve a separate inquiry?59 Disparate interpretations of
the circumstances under which a prosecutor may constitutionally
admit pre-arrest silence as an indication of guilt have resulted in a
split among circuits and states.60
silence derives, not from Miranda, but from the Fifth Amendment itself.") See also Colorado
v. Rogers, No. 01-CA0105, 2002 Colo. App. LEXIS 1627, at *12 (Colo. Ct. App. Sept. 12,
2002) (citations omitted) (Agreeing with the court in Easter that, "in some circumstances,
use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt is impermissible,
because 'an accused's right to silence derives, not from Miranda, but from the Fifth
Amendment itself,' and any time an individual is questioned by the police, that individual is
compelled to do one of two things-either speak or remain silent. If both a person's prearrest
speech and silence may be used against that person ... that person has no choice that will
prevent self-incrimination.").
55 "When a citizen is under no official compulsion whatever, either to speak or to remain
silent, I see no reason why his voluntary decision to do one or the other should raise any
issue under the Fifth Amendment." Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 241 (1980) (Stevens,
J. concurring).
56 Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to
Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625 (1996) [hereinafter "Alschuler, Peculiar Privilege r"].
A different version of this author's article under the same title was published in a later
collection of essays. See Alschuler, Peculiar Privilege H, supra note 19.
" Id. at 2627.
58 The Supreme Court has not clearly defined what constitutes compulsion. See Amar &
Lettow, supra note 17, at 865 ("[A]t times, the Justices of the Supreme Court have become
engrossed by relatively trivial forms of compulsion; at other times they have zigged and
zagged erratically; and at still other times they have turned a blind eye to dangerous
compulsion threatening our core concerns").
59 In Jenkins, the Court limited the prohibition of impeachment use of silence that occurs
after arrest, as in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), because such silence is induced by the
implicit assurance of Miranda warnings that silence will not be used against the accused.
Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239-40.
60 William M. Speek, Evidence-The Weight of Silence: Determining the Use of Pre-
arrest Silence as Substantive Evidence, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 413, 414 (1997) ("The split
SARA CIARELLI [Vol. 93
III. THE DEBATE OVER THE SUBSTANTIVE USE OF PRE-ARREST SILENCE AS
AN INDICATOR OF GUILT
In constructing the legal arguments for and against substantive
use of pre-arrest silence, one can take many analytical paths.61 A
common path that opposes substantive use of pre-arrest silence is
based on Griffin v. California,62 and considers that the right to remain
silence is a constitutional right that extends to the pre-arrest stage of
investigation.63 A path that permits substantive use of pre-arrest
silence draws from the Supreme Court's more recent cases, namely
Jenkins v. Anderson,64 in arguing that use of pre-arrest silence to
create an inference of guilt should be permitted.65 First I will discuss
the path that relies on Griffin, and then I will discuss the path that
relies on Jenkins.
A. THE GRIFFIN APPROACH
The argument for prohibiting prosecutors from using pre-arrest
silence as evidence of guilt rests heavily on the interpretation of
Miranda that posits that the right to remain silent is a broad
among jurisdictions regarding the use of pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt is
based upon varying views as to the extent of an arrestee's Fifth Amendment rights"). The
First, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits prohibit the substantive use of pre-arrest silence; the
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits allow it. See infra notes 109-11 (for specific
cases' citations). Minnesota, Washington, Wisconsin, Ohio, Georgia and Tennessee prohibit
substantive use of pre-arrest silence; California and Michigan allow it. See infra note Ill
(for specific case citations).
6 1 This comment refrains from exhausting the possible arguments for and against the
admissibility of pre-arrest silence. One additional possible argument is that evidence of pre-
arrest silence may be more prejudicial than probative, and thus fail the relevance requirement
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Combs. v. Coyle, 205 F.3d. 269, 286 (6th Cir. 2000)
(citing Ohio evidentiary rule-equivalent to FED. R. EvID. 403-which states, "Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." Ot-o R. EVID. 403.).
6 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
63 See generally Jane E. Notz, Note, Prearrest Silence as Evidence of Guilt: What You
Don't Say Shouldn't Be Used Against You, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009 (1997) (discussing the
Griffin test and how it is applied).
64 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
65 See generally Notz, supra note 63 (note discusses how courts rely on the recent test in
Jenkins v. Anderson). See also Craig W. Strong, Note, A Contextual Framework for the
Admissibility of a Criminal Defendant's Pre-Arrest Silence: United States v. Oplinger, 79
NEB. L. REV. 448 (2000) (discussing the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' reliance on Jenkins).
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constitutional right that extends to the period before arrest.66 Scholars
have presented Griffin v. California67 as Miranda's predecessor in the
development of the right to remain silent. 6 Under the holding of
Griffin, a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant's choice not to
testify at trial to create an inference of the defendant's guilt.69 Griffin
established what is now called the "penalty doctrine,"7 which forbids
"a penalty imposed [on a defendant] by the courts for exercising a
constitutional privilege."'" The penalty doctrine has been viewed as a
central tool that ensures that the focus in criminal cases is not on
whether the defendant committed the acts of which he is accused, but
whether the Government has met its burden to prove its allegations.72
The Court stretched the penalty doctrine so far as to require judges,
upon request by the defense attorney, to instruct juries not to make an
adverse inference from a defendant's choice not to testify.73
Griffin characterized the defendant's failure to testify as
"silence."74 Griffin's judicial descendants extended Griffin's oft-
quoted dicta of the case to silence before trial, even though Griffin
solely dealt with the defendant's decision not to testify at trial:75
"What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing.
What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the
accused into evidence against him is quite another."76
Courts have indeed extended the spirit of Griffin to pre-trial
silence.77 The Supreme Court in Doyle v. Ohio7 meshed the rights
66 E.g., State v. Easter, 922 P.2d 1285, 1290 (Wash. 1996) ("The Fifth Amendment
applies before the defendant is in custody or is the subject of suspicion or investigation.").
See also Pettit, supra note 29, at 191-92 (arguing that Miranda's text implies that Miranda
rights may be extended to a "non-custodial, pre-arrest situation").
67 380 U.S. 609 (1965)
68 See Alschuler, Peculiar Privilege II, supra note 19, at 197-201; see also O'Neill,
supra note 25, at 872 (indicating that Griffin was the step before Miranda in the
development of the right to silence).
69 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614-15.
70 Notz, supra note 63, at 1012.
7 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
72 State v. Mitchell, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999) (extends Griffin by holding that adverse
inference regarding a defendant's failure to testify is not permitted in sentencing hearings).
73 Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
74 Griffin, 380 U.S. 614-15.
75 The First, Seventh and Tenth Circuits extended the holding of Griffin to protect pre-
arrest silence, even though the Griffin holding only applies to silence at trial. See discussion
infra note 108.
76 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
77 See Michael R. Patrick, Note, Toward the Constitutional Protection of a Non-
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recited in Miranda warnings with the penalty doctrine in holding that
any adverse use, whether substantive or for impeachment, of post-
arrest, post-Miranda silence violates a defendant's due process
rights.79 The Court explained that while Miranda warnings did not
expressly assure the adverse use of invoking the right to silence, such
assurance was implied, rendering adverse use of silence a violation of
the defendant's due process rights.8"
The underlying assumption of the lower federal and state courts
that apply Griffin to pre-arrest silence is fairly logical: since Griffin
prohibits a prosecutor from using a defendant's silence at trial against
him, Griffin should likewise prohibit a prosecutor from using pre-
arrest silence against him.8 However, Griffin has been the target of
criticism since its publication, and may be an outdated means of
analysis.82 In his dissent in Griffin, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice
White, pointed out the majority's broad departure from the original
purpose of the Fifth Amendment to protect a defendant from state
compulsion by referencing seventeenth century interrogation
practices.83 Because the defendant in Griffin chose not to testify, no
state compulsion was present and comment on this choice was a
"means of articulating and bringing into the light of rational
discussion a fact inescapably impressed on the jury's
consciousness." 4  Moreover, the dissenters called for a return to
decisions based on the "lurid realities" behind the enactment of the
Fifth Amendment that were a "far cry" from the subject matter of
Testifying Defendant's Prearrest Silence, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 897, 898 (1997).
78 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
79 The court held that using post-arrest silence to impeach a defendant violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 620. The Fourteenth Amendment
applies the rights granted under the Fifth Amendment to the States: "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
'o Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618.
"I Ouska v. Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1047 (7th Cir. 2001) (Griffin "applies
equally to a defendant's silence before trial, and indeed, even before arrest ...." (quoting
United States ex. rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1987))). See Combs v.
Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 282 (6th Cir. 2000) (joining other circuits in deciding that the
application of the privilege extends to the pre-arrest period, and thus holding that Griffin's
penalty doctrine applies to this period); see also Notz, supra note 64, at 1013-14 (explaining
Griffin analysis).
82 Notz, supra note 63, at 1011.
83 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 620 (Stewart, J., dissenting).




Likewise, current Supreme Court justices oppose the extension
of Griffin, stating that "Griffin's pedigree is... dubious" and "out of
sync" with the historical understanding that the Fifth Amendment
was designed to ban compulsory oaths or torture.86 In Portuondo v.
Agard, v the Court restricted Griffin's penalty doctrine to only apply
to comments encouraging inferences of guilt from a defendant's
failure to testify; encouraging adverse inferences drawn from the
exercise of related constitutional rights-in this case, the rights to be
present at trial and confront one's accusers-was held permissible.8
In addition, the Court limited Griffin in Jenkins v. Anderson,89 which
is discussed in the next section. Thus, the Court has so undermined
Griffin's holding that the penalty doctrine's scope may be limited to
the exercise of silence at trial.9"
B. THE JENKINS APPROACH
Commentators that support permitting a prosecutor to use pre-
arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt argue that the interest in
preserving the truth-seeking function of trials outweighs the burden
on a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights.9" Presently, the Supreme
Court's protection of silence from adverse inference only applies to
the time after Miranda rights are given.92 In Jenkins v. Anderson,93
85 "1 think that the Court in this case stretches the concept of compulsion beyond all
reasonable bounds." Griffin, 380 U.S. at 620.
86 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting). "The
illogic of the Griffin line is plain, for it runs counter to normal evidentiary inferences . . . . If
I ask my son whether he saw a movie I had forbidden him to watch, and he remains silent,
the import of his silence is clear." Id.
87 529 U.S. 61 (2000).
88 Id. (holding that a prosecutor's comment in closing argument about a defendant's
ability to listen to a trial's testimony and tailor his testimony accordingly did not violate the
defendant's due process rights). Justice Ginsberg, joined by Justice Souter, grounded their
dissent in the penalty doctrine: "The Court today transforms a defendant's presence at trial
from a Sixth Amendment right into an automatic burden on his credibility." Id. at 76-77.
89 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
90 Notz, supra note 63, at 1017.
91 See Notz, supra note 63, at 1018 (explains how a prosecutor's use of prearrest silence
may enhance the reliability of the criminal process). The Court has recognized "the
significance of silence in civil cases, stating that that 'failure to contest an assertion ... is
considered evidence of acquiescence ... if it would have been natural under the
circumstances to object to the assertion in question."' Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 332 (Scalia, J.
dissenting) (quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976)).
92 See infra discussion in this Section III.B.
93 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
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the Court held that pre-arrest silence may be admitted on cross-
examination to impeach a defendant's credibility.94 After the
defendant maintained self-defense, the prosecutor cross-examined the
accused about his failure to turn himself in after he stabbed a man.95
The prosecutor then commented on his pre-arrest silence in the
closing argument.96 The Court held that the prosecutor's treatment of
the defendant's pre-arrest silence was permissible because it was
used to impeach the defendant's credibility, a practice the defendant
invited by taking the stand.97
The Jenkins Court put forth a balancing test that tamed the
effects of Griffin: "In determining whether a constitutional right has
been burdened impermissibly, it also is appropriate to consider the
legitimacy of the challenged governmental practice." 98 Because
impeachment on cross-examination enhances the reliability of the
criminal process, the Court stated, the Fifth Amendment is not
violated when pre-arrest silence is used to impeach a criminal
defendant's credibility. 99  The Jenkins Court also implicitly
undermined the Griffin penalty doctrine, stating that the "Constitution
does not forbid every government-imposed choice in the criminal
process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of
constitutional rights.'
' °°
The Supreme Court commented further on pre-trial silence in
Fletcher v. Weir... in which it held that impeachment use of post-
arrest, pre-Miranda silence does not offend due process."' it
distinguished Doyle v. Ohio"°3 by pointing out that in Doyle, Miranda
warnings induced the defendant to remain silent, whereas in Fletcher,
94 Id. The Jenkins court thus permitted the attack of a defendant's credibility by using
evidence pre-arrest silence to contradict the defendant's testimony or otherwise call his
credibility into question. Notably, however, the "prosecutor attempted to impeach the
petitioner's credibility by suggesting that the petitioner would have spoken out if he had
killed in self-defense." Id. at 235. Essentially, the prosecutor suggested that the petitioner
did not kill in self-defense. This clearly encourages an inference of guilt that may be more
prejudicial to the defendant than a mere attack on his credibility as a witness.
9' Id. at 233.
96 Id. at 234.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 238.
99 Id. at 238. The Court, however, declined to address whether pre-arrest silence is
privileged under the Fifth Amendment at all. Patrick, supra note 77, at 912.
"' Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238.
'0' 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
102 id.
103 426 U.S. 610 (1976); see supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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the defendant was not instructed of such a right."4 This opinion
adopts the idea that Miranda rights are merely prophylactic against
coercive government treatment rather than a restatement of an
absolute Fifth Amendment right;' the right to remain silent free
from adverse inference begins when the government reads a suspect
his Miranda rights. Consistent with this view, courts have held that
in the absence of state compulsion, which is determined based on the
formal custody of the accused, 10 6 pre-arrest silence may be used as
substantive evidence of guilt.0 7
IV. THE SPLIT IN CASE LAW: DIFFERING VIEWS OF COMPULSION AND
INVOCATION
The lower court cases involving pre-arrest silence have grown in
the landscape designed by the Supreme Court, with the broad
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment applied through Griffin
extending in one direction, and the narrow treatment of silence in
Jenkins extending in another direction. In the federal courts of
appeals, the circuits are split; the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits hold that substantive use of pre-arrest silence violates
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,0 8 relying
104 Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 605.
105 Miranda rights have been repeatedly referred to by the Court as "prophylactic" and
"not themselves rights protected by the Constitution." Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 437 (2000) (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984)); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974). See also infra Section II. (explaining the vacillating
interpretations of the Fifth Amendment).
106 See infra Section II. (discussing Beheler v. California, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) and
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) and how custody defines compulsion).
107 See discussion infra note 110 (listing cases allowing substantive use of pre-arrest
silence).
108 United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that
Griffin extends to pre-arrest silence when the defendant chooses not to testify and upheld,
but distinguished, in United States v. Bonner, 302 F.3d 776, 783-84 (7th Cir. 2002)); United
States v. Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that when the prosecution refers
to pre-Miranda silence in its case-in-chief, that reference demonstrates that those comments
were intended as an inference of the defendant's guilt, even when the defendant later takes
the stand); Ouska v. Cahill- Masching, 246 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
substantive use of defendant's pre-arrest silence violated her constitutional rights); Coppola
v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that admission of evidence of
defendant's pre-arrest silence was plain error); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1201
(10th Cir. 1991) (finding the admission of testimony concerning defendant's silence to be
plain error on the grounds that once a defendant invokes his right to remain silent, it is
impermissible for the prosecution to refer to any Fifth Amendment rights to which defendant
exercised, citing Griffin); United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that
"we have found no decision permitting the use of silence, even the silence of a suspect who
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principally on Griffin. "9 The Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits extend the logic of Jenkins to hold that the government may
use pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt. 1"0 States are
similarly split."'
Regardless of whether a court decided to admit evidence of pre-
arrest silence, courts"' have made two key inquiries in making their
decision: whether the suspect was questioned in a police-dominated
atmosphere that would result in compelled testimony, and whether
the privilege against self-incrimination was invoked in a reasonable
response to such an atmosphere. The logic employed by many of
has been given no Miranda warnings and is entitled to none, as part of the Government's
direct case"); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that substantive use of
a defendant's pre-arrest silence violates defendant's Fifth Amendment rights).
109 Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 282 (6th Cir. 2000). See also Strong, supra note 65, at
457; Patrick, supra note 77, at 898 (explains courts' reliance on Griffin).
10 United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991) (comment on pre-arrest
silence was harmless error); United States v. Campbell, 223 F.3d 1286 (11 th Cir. 2000)
(interpreting Rivera to hold that a prosecutor may comment on a defendant's pre-arrest, pre-
Miranda silence without restriction); Vick v. Lockhart, 952 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1991)
(remanding for a determination of when the defendant received Miranda rights, based on the
conclusion that pre-Miranda silence is not constitutionally protected); United States v.
Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding no plain error in admitting pre-arrest
silence in the absence of government action on the ground that the fifth amendment does not
"preclude evidentiary use about every communication or lack thereof by the defendant which
may give rise to an incriminating inference"); United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061 (9th
Cir. 1998) (holding that substantive use of pre-arrest silence is permitted when there is an
absence of government compulsion). See also Strong, supra note 66, at 898 (explains how
circuits rely on Jenkins).
111 Many states prohibit substantive use of pre-arrest silence, both for constitutional and
evidentiary reasons. See, e.g., Colorado v. Rogers, No. 01-CA0105, 2002 Colo. App. LEXIS
1627 (Colo. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2002) holding that defendant's response to police was not
silence, but stating that using pre-arrest silence to imply guilt is constitutionally
impermissible); Frazier v. State, 544 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. App. 2001); Minnesota v. Houseman,
No. C 1-00-2196, 2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 1130 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Geboy, 764
N.E.2d 451 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2001); State v. Haire, No. 01-CA-0105, 2002 Tenn.
Crim. App. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 22, 2002); State v. Easter, 922 P.2d 1285
(Wash. 1996); State v. Glenn, 628 N.W.2d 438 (Wis. 2001); Lancaster v. Wyoming, 43 P.3d
80 (Wyo. 2002) (holding that use of pre-arrest silence is impermissible, but upholding
conviction because prejudicial error did not occur.) Other states allow it. See, e.g., People v.
Nesbitt, No. B141286, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 794, at *37 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 12,
2001) (following Oplinger); People v. Mitchell, No. 213400, 2001 Mich. App. LEXIS 764
(Mich. Ct. App. May 11, 2001); Martinez v. Texas, No. 07-01-350-CR, 2002 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4518 (Tex. App. June 24, 2002).
112 This statement excludes courts that simply follow precedent by interpreting a higher
court's holding to admit or exclude pre-arrest silence as a blanket prohibition or allowance.
E.g., Washington v. Raper, No. 47932-6-1, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 110 (Wash. Ct. App.
Jan. 22, 2002).
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these courts" 3 follows the Justice Stevens' concurrence in Jenkins v.
Anderson. 4  Justice Stevens wrote, "the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination is simply irrelevant to a citizen's
decision to remain silent when he is under no official compulsion to
speak.""'  He explained, "The fact that a citizen has a constitutional
right to remain silent when he is questioned has no bearing on the
probative significance of his silence before he has any contact with
the police.""' 6 Thus, the difference in the cases' outcomes often rests
on the courts' differing views of what police-citizen interaction
results in a situation in which a reasonable suspect would feel
compelled to incriminate herself."7
A. COURTS THAT PROHIBIT SUBSTANTIVE USE OF PRE-ARREST
SILENCE: BROAD DEFINITIONS OF COMPULSION AND
INVOCATION
Courts that prohibited the substantive use of pre-arrest silence
did so on the basis of the coercive nature of the police-citizen
encounter. For instance, the Sixth Circuit, in joining the Seventh,
First, and Tenth Circuits in prohibiting substantive use of pre-arrest
silence, stated that "[1]ike those circuits, we believe that 'application
of the privilege is not limited to persons in custody or charged with a
crime; it may also be asserted by a suspect who is questioned during
the investigation of a crime.""' 8 So while the Sixth Circuit joined the
ranks of the courts that prohibited the use of pre-arrest silence, it
impliedly limited this prohibition to silence in response to the
questioning law enforcement by making its determination based on
the factual element of the presence of police investigators.' As
such, the Sixth Circuit's definition of compulsion included
questioning by law enforcement officers. 2 ° Likewise, in Ouska v.
113 E.g., Oplinger, 150 F.3d. 1061.
"14 447 U.S. 231.
I'' Id. at 241.
116 Id. at 243.
117 See generally Patrick, supra note 77 (discussing scenarios that could possibly fall
under several different "Coercion Models").
1 1 Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Coppola v. Powell, 878
F.2d 1562 (1st Cir. 1989)).
119 People v. Francisco C., 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4571, at *140 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 25, 2002) ("However, Combs drew the additional distinction that even assuming the
Fifth Amendment was inapplicable to precustody context, the privilege was still applicable
to the defendant therein because the court agreed defendant was in custody at the time").
120 Combs, 205 F.3d at 283-84.
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Cahill-Masching,"2' the court found that Ouska made a substantial
showing that her constitutional rights were violated when the
prosecutor commented on her pre-arrest silence that occurred in
response to police questioning in a police station."'2 Ouska was in the
police station voluntarily and was not under arrest, yet the court
found that such a setting triggered Ouska's Fifth Amendment
protections. "'
Similarly, in State v. Easter,'24 the defendant refused to answer
questions of a police officer.'25 In finding a violation of the
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights from the prosecution's
substantive use of this silence, the court distinguished this from a
previous case that allowed the substantive use of pre-arrest silence
where the defendant refused to answer a civilian's questions.126 The
state of Georgia, which prohibited substantive use of pre-arrest
silence, limited this prohibition to a defendant's silence "in the face
of questions by an agent of the State or his failure to come forward
when he knew that he was a target of criminal investigation."'
27
Therefore, courts that prohibit substantive use of pre-arrest silence as
an indicator of guilt seem to condition this prohibition on the fact that
the silence was in response to questioning by government agents.
Related to the factual inquiry about the presence of government
agents, courts have asked whether the defendant reasonably invoked
his right to remain silent in response to questioning. 28  The
invocation inquiry calls for an objective determination as to whether
the defendant was aware of the right to remain silent having not
received Miranda warnings. 129  In Coppola v. Powell,' the First
Circuit stressed that Fifth Amendment privileges are privileges that
121 246 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2001).
122 Id. at 1048.
123 Id.
124 922 P.2d 1285 (Wash. 1996).
125 Id. at 1287-88.
126 Id. at 1291.
127 Morrison v. State, 554 S.E.2d 190, 193 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
128 In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), the Court held that the suspect must
clearly and unequivocally invoke his Fifth Amendment rights in order to receive its
protection.
129 See Easter, 922 P.2d at 1290-91 ("[A]n accused's silence in the face of police
questioning is quite expressive as to the person's intent to invoke the right regardless of
whether it is pre-arrest or post-arrest."); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d at 284 ("A reasonable
person in Comb's situation could have believed he was under arrest").
130 878 F.2d 1562 (st Cir. 1989).
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must be claimed, even if the attempt to claim the privilege is feeble;
"in determining whether the privilege has been invoked, the 'entire
context in which the claimant spoke must be considered."'131  The
Tenth Circuit in United States v. Burson13 1 interpreted Griffin's rule
of law to state that "once a defendant invokes his right to remain
silent, it is impermissible for the prosecution to refer to any Fifth
Amendment rights which the defendant exercised." ' Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit in United States ex. rel. Savory v. Lane1 34 held the
substantive use of silence as an indication of guilt impermissible, but
relied on the fact that the defendant did not testify to distinguish the
case from Jenkins and its progeny; 135 by remaining silent before trial
and during trial, the right to silence was unequivocally invoked, so
the court extended the protection of Griffin to the time before trial. 1
36
A factor related to the invocation inquiry is that the right to
silence is a privilege upon which many rely 137 because of its
pervasion of popular culture.'38 For example, in Coppolla, the court
analyzed the defendant's statement to the police that he would not
speak to them without his lawyer. 39 The court found that the
defendant invoked his privilege against self-incrimination because
the statement indicated that he had knowledge of this privilege. 4 In
deciding this, the court mentioned that the defendant had been
questioned earlier that day, and knew that his friends were
questioned, therefore the defendant likely knew that he had the right
not to incriminate himself. 4'
These factual inquiries link to the question of how much police
presence amounts to a circumstance described by Miranda as one that
may result in a statement in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 4  The
rule derived from these cases is that, when a suspect is in a situation
131 Id. at 1565 (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 470 F.2d 893, 902 (5th Cir. 1972)).
132 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991).
133 Id. at 1201 (emphasis added).
134 United States ex. rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1987).
131 Id. at 1017-18.
136 id.
137 See discussion infra Section V.A. (discussing silence as a right upon which people
rely in presence of law enforcement).
138 See Pettit, supra note 29, at 181 (mentions the popularity of police and law shows in
the media).
139 Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1567 (1st Cir. 1989).
140 Id.
141 id.
142 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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in which he reasonably relies on the right to remain silent and
reasonably invokes it in response to a certain level of state pressure,
the silence is protected from adverse inference.
B. COURTS THAT ALLOW SUBSTANTIVE USE OF PRE-ARREST SILENCE:
NARROW VIEWS OF COMPULSION AND INVOCATION
Even though other courts reached an opposite outcome, their
inquiry into the degree of compulsion in a police-citizen encounter
was consistent with the cases that hold the inclusion of pre-arrest
silence in error. Like the cases that prohibited use of pre-arrest
silence, these cases shaped their analysis based on the presence of
government agents and whether the suspect invoked his right to
silence. In United States v. Zanabria,"'43 the Fifth Circuit allowed
comment on the defendant's pre-arrest silence, because the
referenced silence was not asserted in the presence of law
enforcement agents:"' "[tihe fifth amendment.., does not...
preclude the proper evidentiary use and prosecutorial comment about
every communication or lack thereof by the defendant which may
give rise to an incriminating inference." '45 The Ninth Circuit applied
a narrow concept of how much law enforcement presence may
constitute an atmosphere of state compulsion in United States v.
Oplinger.'46  Oplinger emphasized the absence of law enforcement
personnel when the defendant refused to answer his employer's
questions.'47 Like the aforementioned cases, the Oplinger court
focused on the presence of state compulsion as the test for invoking
Fifth Amendment privileges. 4 ' But because the defendant's silence
occurred prior to the arrival of police, the court found that the
defendant was not compelled to speak.'49 Therefore, the defendant
was not entitled to the Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination that was "intended as a 'limitation on the investigative
techniques of the government, not as an individual right against the
141 United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1996).
144 The evidence of silence was the defendant's failure to tell authorities that he was in
need of financial help and was used to rebut the defendant's duress defense. Id.at 593.
145 Id.
146 United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1998); see also United States v.
Angwin, 263 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001); People v. Nesbitt, No. B141286, 2001 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 794, at *37 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2001).
147 Oplinger, 150 F.3d at 1066.
148 id.
149 Id. at 1061.
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world."'"" 0 A recent Ninth Circuit case applying Oplinger held that,
because the defendant was not yet in custody, the prosecutor's
comment on her silence as constituting substantive evidence of her
guilt was proper. 5 ' The defendant faced routine questions from a
border patrol agent, but the court held that this was not custody
because "special rules apply at the border,"' 12 and an act of physical
confinement is required for a defendant to be in custody at a border
checkpoint.' Thus, the analytical difference between cases that
have prohibited the substantive use of pre-arrest silence and those
that have allowed it is minimal; regardless of the outcome, courts on
opposite "sides" of the pre-arrest silence argument base their
decisions on facts involving the presence of law enforcement officers.
Like the courts that prohibited substantive use of pre-arrest
silence, courts that have permitted its use have inquired as to whether
the defendant reasonably invoked his right to remain silent.'54 In
United States v. Rivera, 55 the court examined the nature of the
silence in deciding that comment on the silence was harmless error.'56
The silence at issue was the defendant's failure to protest or react
when a customs' officer searched his bags.'57 The court explored
whether there was a rational distinction between acting silent and
being silent.'58 It recognized that silence does not mean only
muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent but
that "there is no definite outer boundary in determining what types of
nonverbal conduct or demeanor, whether assertive or nonassertive, a
prosecutor may permissibly comment on without running afoul of the
dictates of Miranda. "159
Even though the outcomes of these cases have resulted in a
categorization of courts as either permitting substantive evidence of
pre-arrest silence or not, a closer look at the factual inquiries that
these courts employed indicates that the actual controversy that needs
to be resolved by the Supreme Court is not the broad question of
I50 d. at 1067 (citing United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1456 (11th Cir.1997)).
SI United States v. Angwin, 263 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001).
152Id. at 1000 n.6 (quoting United States v. Butler, 249 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2001)).
153 Id.
154 See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984); State v. Millay, 787 A.2d 129 (Me.
2001).
' 944 F.2d 1563 (1 Ith Cir. 1991).






whether substantive use of pre-arrest silence as an indicator of guilt is
definitively in violation of the Constitution. Rather, the Supreme
Court must clarify what constitutes a compelling atmosphere, under
Miranda, that would place a suspect in the position in which he
would invoke his or her right to silence regardless of whether he is
officially under arrest. Such a delineation, if it is successful in
determining whether a person is in a coercive situation, 6 ' would
satisfy both sides of the debate about pre-arrest silence. A
compulsion test would prevent adverse inference from silence made
by a suspect who is silent in response to the pressure to self-
incriminate, and would thus hold consistent with the history of the
Fifth Amendment's development. 6' Furthermore, a compulsion test
would allow rational inferences to be drawn from highly probative
silence that is not in response to pressure from law enforcement.
62
V. THE DELINEATION OF COMPULSION AND THE INTERSECTION OF FOURTH
AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS
In order to determine what sort of state action constitutes
compulsion, courts should consider the realities of police practices
permitted by the Fourth Amendment. 163  In certain police-citizen
encounters, silence may lack any probative value as an indicator of
guilt because a person may rely on her right to remain silent. 164 But
certain police practices permitted by the Fourth Amendment do not
entitle a person to Miranda safeguards, 6 ' and thus, a court may not
160 However, defining the constitutional propriety of police conduct without a case-by-
case examination may be difficult.
161 See infra Section II.
162 This would also satisfy those who propose "one global rule of compulsion: reasonable
adverse inferences from suspicious silence outside courtrooms need not always be treated as
Fifth Amendment 'compulsion."' Amar & Lettow, supra note 16, at 909.
163 Fourth Amendment law of searches and seizures is the only constitutional restriction
placed on law enforcement investigation practices:
To label any police activity a "search" or a "seizure" within the ambit of the Amendment is to
impose ... restrictions upon it. On the other hand, if it is not labeled a "search" or "seizure" it is
subject to no restrictions of any kind. It is only "searches" or "seizures" that the fourth
amendment requires to be reasonable: police activities of any other sort may be as unreasonable
as the police please to make them.
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MrNN. L. REV. 349, 385
(1974), excerpted in RONALD H. ALLEN ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS, AND RELATED AREAS 541
(3d ed. 1995).
164 See infra Section V.
165 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
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view this person to be in a situation of compulsion.'66 As a result, a
defendant's pre-arrest silence would be vulnerable to adverse
inference even if it has low probative value of the defendant's guilt.
This section will first explain why silence in the presence of law
enforcement may have low probative value. 6 ' Then, it will illustrate
why the Fourth and Fifth Amendment conflict by presenting police
practices as shaped by Fourth Amendment restrictions and the Fifth
Amendment protections granted to a suspect in light of these
practices. '68
A. SILENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT MAY HAVE
LOW PROBATIVE VALUE AS AN INDICATOR OF GUILT
Silence in the presence of a law enforcement officer may have a
low probative value as an indicator of guilt that would be outweighed
by the prejudice to the defendant at trial. When a person is
confronted by police, there are many reasons why the person would
refuse to speak to the police that have nothing to do with the person's
guilt of committing a crime:"' "it is an unfortunate truth that many
people in our society, especially those involved in life on the street,
view the police as antagonists rather than protectors and react to
police contact with extreme suspicion, distrust, and lack of
cooperation."' 7 ° This is especially true given the United States' war
on terrorism; police are questioning immigrants at unprecedented
rates and racial profiling is inevitably more common. 1"' A person
may refuse to speak to police simply out of fear and intimidation.'72
166 See United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 1998) (In allowing
substantive use of pre-arrest silence, the court reasoned, "the fact that a citizen has a
constitutional right to remain silent when he is questioned has no bearing on the probative
significance of his silence before he has any contact with the police").
167 See infra Section IV.A.
168 See infra Section IV.B.
169 Key-El v. State, 709 A.2d 1305, 1315 (Md. 1998) (Raker, J., dissenting).
170 Notz, supra note 64, at 1029 (quoting People v. Conyers, 400 N.E.2d 342, 348 (N.Y.
1980)).
17 1 David Hench, Maine Immigrants React to Increase in Police Scrutiny; Some Take the
Police Interviews in Stride as a National Security Necessity. But For Others They Can Be
Traumatic, ME. SUNDAY TELEGRAM, Dec. 9, 2001, at IA, available at 2001 WL 27640534.
Ali Khan, the subject of the scenario, recounted that "he felt intimidated and humiliated
when questioned near the counter as hundreds of other travelers looked on ..... 'I don't
want this to happen to another American Muslim,"' he stated. Tetreault, supra note 2, at 1B.
172 Dorcas Gilpatrick, the associate director of the Maine Civil Liberties Union,
expressed, "'Many immigrants are intimidated and somewhat frightened when a police
officer comes to the door."' Hench, supra note 171, at IA. See also Notz, supra note 63, at
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A person may refuse to respond to questioning because she may be
involved in unrelated transactions, criminal or non-criminal, that she
may not want to reveal to the police) 73 A suspect may refuse to
respond to questioning because an accomplice or other third-party
has intimidated him with threats if he talks to the police.7 4 A suspect
may refuse to respond in order to protect a friend or family
member.'75 Furthermore, the right to silence is a right upon which
many would rely; because of the repetition of 'you have the right to
remain silent' in the media,'76 silence may appear to provide the only
safe harbor from criminal prosecution and conviction.'77
Thus, the reasons for silence are varied and many of these
reasons have nothing to do with guilt associated with committing the
specific crime. Nevertheless, a person accused of a crime may
invoke her Fifth Amendment rights through silence because she is in
an intimidating situation-a police officer may pat down her body
searching for weapons,' or badger her with questions in a setting
that is removed from the public.'79 Despite the invocation through
silence, prosecutors may be allowed to use this silence in a way that
would suggest that it was a tacit admission of guilt 8 ° that is more
1029.
173 Notz, supra note 63, at 1029.
174 See Witness Intimidation on the Rise in Drug Cases, THE RECORD, Aug. 5, 1994, at
A14.
'75 Notz, supra note 63, at 1029.
176 "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the
warnings have become part of our national culture." Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 430 (2000); see also Pettit, supra note 29, at 181.
177 Philip Key-El v. State, 709 A.2d 1305, 1315 (Md. 1998) (Raker, J. dissenting) (a
person's "awareness that he is under no obligation to speak or... the knowledge that
anything he says might later be used against him at trial" may be reasons why the person
would refuse to speak to the police, which renders silence ambiguous). In fact, it is probably
in a person's best interest to refuse to answer questions posed by the police in an
investigation because police often try to postpone formal arrests in order to accumulate
evidence that could be used to convict: "Good police practice often requires postponing an
arrest, even after probable cause has been established, in order to place the suspect under
surveillance or otherwise develop further evidence necessary to prove guilt to ajury." United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,431 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). "In criminal cases...
troublesome questions have been raised by decisions holding that failure to deny is an
admission: the inference is a fairly weak one, to begin with; silence may be motivated by
advice of counsel or realization that 'anything you say may be used against you."' FED. R.
EVID. 801 (d)(2)(B) advisory committee's note.
178 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
179 See infra Section IV.B.
180 If the accused testifies, a prosecutor will be permitted to cross-examine her with pre-
arrest silence. If she does not testify, a prosecutor will be allowed to use the pre-arrest
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prejudicial to the accused than it is probative-and may violate her
Fifth Amendment rights.
B. THE COLLISION OF THE FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS AT THE
TERRY STOP
181
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures by the government.'82 Seizure of a person occurs "when, 'in
view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident,' a person
reasonably believes he or she is not 'free to leave' an encounter with
a government official."'83  In Terry v. Ohio,'84 the Supreme Court
analyzed a type of police activity classified as a "stop and frisk."' 85 A
Terry stop requires a showing of reasonable suspicion'86 that is a
lower standard than the probable cause requirement of a traditional
search and seizure.
87
A Terry stop is essentially an arrest-a seizure of a person-and
the Supreme Court has recognized that, "Terry unquestionably
involved conduct that would constitute a common-law seizure."'88
Despite this recognition, courts have created a dynamic imaginary
line that separates a mere stop from an arrest based on the amount of
silence to create an adverse inference in the Fifth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits. See infra
Section III (discussing current case law.)
' See generally Godsey, supra note 50.
182 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
183 Seanna Beck, Thirtieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Introduction and
Guide for Users: I. Investigation and Police Practices: Overview of the Fourth Amendment,
89 GEO. L.J. 1055, 1059 (2001). The "free to leave" test was set forth in United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
184 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
185 Id. at 10.
186 Terry did not articulate the phrase "reasonable suspicion," however, its subsequent
cases have interpreted Terry to stand for this standard. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
U.S. 119 (2000).
187 Wardlow describes the standard as follows:
"[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing
in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others'
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which
may be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment. "
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
'" California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627 n.3 (1991).
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force applied by a law enforcement officer.189 The Supreme Court
has dictated that only when a person is formally "under arrest," a
concept that does not include Terry stops,90 is a person entitled to
Miranda safeguards.19 So even though a Terry stop may share many
characteristics of an arrest, such as physical touching,192 guns,
handcuffs, the placement of a detainee in a police car,' 93 a person may
not necessarily refuse to answer an officer's questions free from a
juror's potential adverse inference of his or her guilt.
Restrictions on freedom permitted by Terry run counter to
Miranda's specification that procedural safeguards must be employed
if the accused's freedom is deprived in any significant way;' 94 an
individual "subject to an investigative detention who has merely been
'stopped' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment may in fact
need the protections provided by the Miranda safeguards because of
the compelling circumstances of the detention."'9 5 The clash between
Fourth and Fifth Amendment values is best exemplified by the fact
that the use of guns and handcuffs has been held reasonable to
effectuate a Terry stop,' 96 yet use of guns and handcuffs have also
189 Godsey, supra note 50, at 725 n.6 (quoting United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455,
1464 (10th Cir. 1993) ("discussing the 'multifaceted expansion of Terry' to include indicia
of force such as handcuffs and weapons which previously had been considered appropriate
only for arrests").
190 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984).
191 Id.
192 In exploring what type of police action constitutes the arrest of a suspect, the Court
considered that "'[t]here can be constructive detention, which will constitute an arrest,
although the party is never actually brought within the physical control of the party making
an arrest. This is accomplished by merely touching, however slightly, the body of the
accused, by the party making the arrest."' Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625 (quoting ASHER L.
CORNELIUS, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 163-64 (2d ed. 1930) (footnote omitted)).
193 Note, supra note 38, at 671 (citations omitted) ("Courts have authorized the use of
handcuffs, drawn sidearms, and the placement of the detainee on the ground or in a police
car during a Terry stop. Although this increased force may be necessary for public safety, it
may also compel self-incrimination.").
194 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
195 Williamson, supra note 36, at 385.
196 The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Tilmon stated: "Although we are troubled by
the thought of allowing policemen to stop people at the point of a gun when probable cause
to arrest is lacking, we are unwilling to hold that an investigative stop is never lawful when it
can be effectuated safely only in that manner. It is not nice to have a gun pointed at you by a
policeman but it is worse to have a gun pointed at you by a criminal, so there is a complex
tradeoff involved in any proposal to reduce (or increase) the permissible scope of Terry
stops." 19 F.3d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Serna-Banneto, 842
F.2d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 1988)). In addition, in United States v. Perdue, the court wrote: "The
use of guns in connection with a stop is permissible where the police reasonably believe the
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been held to constitute "custody" that would entitle a suspect to
Miranda protections.'97 As one scholar explains:
[T]he extent of the force recently permitted in Terry stops has spot-lighted th[e]
possibility of compulsion. Though not challenging the basic equation-that Fourth
Amendment force translates into Fifth Amendment compulsion-some courts have
tolerated far less force under the Fifth Amendment than they have tolerated under the
Fourth. The increased level of force in Terry stops thus implicates Miranda without
violating the Fourth Amendment limits on a proper stop.
Even without guns and handcuffs, a Terry stop that involves
mere frisks may be intrusive and intimidating enough to prevent a
person from speaking to the police.' 99 A stop and frisk incident in
which a police officer may search the outer clothing of a person in
public is hardly a "petty indignity""' ° and "lilt is a serious intrusion
upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and
arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.20 '
Thus, a person intimidated and humiliated by such a search may
choose not to respond to police questioning with the understanding
that what he says "may be used against him in a court of law. 20 2 He
or she may experience the compulsion that Miranda specifically
intends to deflect.0 3
This problem extends beyond the technical Terry stop, which
focuses on a police officer's interest in ensuring that a suspect does
not have a weapon, to other investigative encounters. The Supreme
Court has held that the Fourth Amendment allows police officers to
question individuals in airports and other public places and search
their belongings, "so long as a reasonable person would understand
that he or she could refuse to cooperate" 24 (or take the hard way, as
weapons are necessary for protection." 8 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 1993). See also
Godsey, supra note 50, at 716 (explaining how in the late 1980s and early 1990s, federal
courts dramatically expanded the level of force that police officers may use in certain Terry
encounters). See id. at 728 n.98-733 n. 126, for examples of cases that have developed Terry.
197 See infra Section II.C.
198 Note, supra note 38, at 672.
199 Even though ideally a Terry stop is "pointed and brief' and "far from the prolonged
interrogations described in Miranda," and intended to "confirm or dispel the particular
suspicions of the officer making the stop," the reality may differ. Id. at 673.
200 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968).
201 id.
202 See Philip Key-El v. State, 709 A.2d 1305, 1315 (Md. 1998) (Raker, J., dissenting);
see also discussion infra notes 169, 177.
203 See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
204 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991).
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opposed to the easy way).2"' But in Florida v. Bostick,2"6 the Court
reversed a finding that that a suspect would have felt free to refuse to
cooperate where armed police questioned a suspect and asked to
search his belongings from the aisle of a moving bus.2"7 Bostick's
dissent touched upon the situation's implication for pre-arrest silence:
[T]he issue is... whether such a passenger-without being apprised of his rights-
would have felt free to terminate the antecedent encounter with the police. Unlike the
majority, I have no doubt that the answer to the question is no ... [The passenger]
could have remained seated while obstinately refusing to respond to the officers'
questioning. But in light of the intimidating show of authority that the officers made
upon boarding the bus, respondent reasonably could have believed that such behavior
would only arouse the officers' suspicions and intensify their interrogations.
2 08
Had the passenger refused to answer the police officers'
questions, many courts may have permitted a prosecutor to use the
suspicion-arousing silence to convince a jury to infer the defendant's
guilt. So even though a person may not feel free to leave the
intimidating presence of a police officer, he or she is left with no
legally prudent option but to cooperate with the police. 29 This may
be a type of compelled testimony that Miranda sought to diminish.
Considering the many reasons why a person may not want to
respond to police inquiries, 210 and considering that cases determining
the admissibility of pre-arrest silence inquire as to whether the
atmosphere when the accused invoked his right to silence was police
dominated,21' the protection of silence from adverse inference should
be extended to detentions even though the Court has rendered them to
be out of the purview of the procedural protection of Miranda.1 2
205 See infra Section 1.
206 Bostick, 501 U.S. 429.
207 Id. at 439-40.
208 Id. at 447 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
209 Some courts have found that this is the type of situation that violates a defendant's
Fifth Amendment rights. As explained in Colorado v. Rogers, "'any time an individual is
questioned by the police, that individual is compelled to do one of two things-either speak
or remain silent. If both a person's pre-arrest speech and silence may be used against that
person ... that person has no choice that will prevent self-incrimination."' Colorado v.
Rogers, No. 01-CA0105, 2002 Colo. App. LEXIS 1627, at *13 (Colo. Ct. App. Sept. 12,
2002) (quoting State v. Fend, 325 N.W.2d 703, 711 (Wis. 1982)).
210 See discussion infra Section V.A.
211 See discussion infra Section Ill. (discussing Miranda and police domination).
212 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). See also Note, supra note 38, at 668
("Unlike the Fifth Amendment, which regulates all police-civilian interactions, Miranda
does not apply to some potentially coercive situations. According to the original
understanding of the decision, the Miranda warning is required only prior to interrogation
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The solution, however, is not necessarily to require police
officers to give a suspect Miranda warnings before every instance of
questioning or frisking. Reciting Miranda warnings is time-
consuming and may encumber an on-the-scene investigation.213
Furthermore, the mere recital of the warning may formalize a police-
citizen interaction, which "may discourage citizens from cooperating
with the police.2 14
A proper solution may be to create a means of evaluating police-
citizen encounters in a way that integrates Fourth and Fifth
Amendment values. The concept of custody under Miranda "is
predicated upon the belief that significant custodial restraints
produce, in the mind of the suspect, a form of prohibited compulsion.
The suspect's state of mind, real or attributed, provides the factual
predicate for the assumption that compulsion exists when a suspect is
in custody. 21 1 However, under Fourth Amendment values,
particularly those governing the issue of whether the suspect
experienced a Terry-type detention or instead was arrested, "the real
or attributed state of mind of the suspect is not important... . When
a seizure has occurred and the issue is whether the seizure is a
nonarrest detention or a de facto arrest, the suspect's state of mind is
irrelevant to the advancement of legitimate Fourth amendment
values."2"6 Courts instead look at other factors such as the length and
scope of the detention, to determine whether a detention was actually
an arrest.217
In defining compulsion for the purposes of admitting or
excluding pre-arrest silence, the suspect's state of mind should be
taken into consideration and applied to brief detentions that are
technically "pre-arrest" but share characteristics of a formal arrest.
The result of this connection between Fourth and Fifth Amendment
values would prevent adverse inference from silence that a person
invoked, or reasonably would have invoked, as an exercise of his
Fifth Amendment right, regardless of whether he was formally
arrested. Rather than using the recitation of Miranda rights as the
bright line that differentiates protected silence from unprotected
when the subject is in custody or is suffering from significant deprivations of freedom").
213 Note, supra note 38, at 678.
214 Id. (quoting George E. Dix, Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure
Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 849,933 (1985)).
215 Williamson, supra note 36, at 404.
216 id.
217 See Note, supra note 38, at 671.
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silence, the Court should examine how a reasonable person under the
circumstances would have viewed his or her position at the time of
the police-citizen encounter.
V. CONCLUSION
The right to remain silent may be more aligned with its historical
origins if it is viewed as the right not to answer." 8 Such a right is
designed to release a suspect from compelled self-incrimination." 9
Many courts have forbidden the substantive use of pre-arrest silence
to create an inference of guilt based on the Griffin penalty doctrine,
which assumes that the right to silence exists beyond circumstances
of compulsion.22° These courts often turn their decisions based on the
presence of a police dominated atmosphere, or whether a reasonable
person would feel compelled to incriminate himself so as to invoke
his right to silence.22' Thus, rather than halt the protection from
adverse inference based on silence at the moment of Miranda rights,
the courts should protect silence based on whether a reasonable
person would feel dominated by police and would desire to invoke
his Fifth Amendment rights. Not only would this approach match up
with the logic employed by the lower courts,222 it would address the
problem of police interactions permitted by the Fourth Amendment
that place a suspect out of range of Miranda protections even though
a reasonable person may be compelled to incriminate himself.3
Rather than adopting a rule that would sweepingly bar or permit the
substantive use of pre-arrest silence in any circumstance, the
consideration of the reasonable suspect's state of mind in brief
detentions would be a practical solution to the circuit split that would
be consistent with the historical development of the Fifth
Amendment.
218 See discussion infra Section II.
219 id.
220 See discussion infra Section III.A.
221 See discussion infra Section IV.
222 id.
223 See discussion infra Section V.
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